StrategicCultureandJapaneseMilitaryIntelligence.pdfVIP

Strategic Culture and Japanese Military Intelligence during the Pacific War, 1941-45 1 Douglas Ford During the opening stages of the Pacific War, when Japan achieved a continuous spate of victories against the Allied forces in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific regions, one of the key factors which contributed to the Imperial Army’s success was the highly developed state of its intelligence capabilities. Japanese commanders had ample data on the location of British and American forces, as well as the layout of their bases and military installations. Propaganda and subversive operations in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies were also carried out efficiently, as evidenced by the large number of local inhabitants who acted as fifth-columnists and scouts for the Japanese invaders. Yet, by the latter stages of the Pacific War, as Japan’s hold on its conquered territories crumbled against the Allied counter-offensive, the weaknesses of the Imperial Japanese Army’s (IJA) intelligence apparatus became increasingly evident. The main shortcoming was an inability to conduct an objective assessment of the material and technological resources that were available to the US and British forces, and a subsequent failure to comprehend the fighting capabilities of the forces that were ranged against the Imperial Army. The problem stemmed largely from the fact that the Japanese military establishment followed a strategic culture which did little to encourage the rank and file to develop a realistic view of its opponents. Intelligence was one of many factors which determined the outcome of the Pacific War. The IJA lost mainly because it did not have capacity simultaneously to subdue the Chinese on the Asiatic main