中级微观经济学——理论与应用（第10版）（经济学经典教材·双语教学用书） 作者 尼克尔森等 著 0324319681_67676.pptVIP

Chapter 14 Imperfect Competition Imperfect Competition Pricing in these markets falls between perfect competition and monopoly. Three topics considered: Pricing of homogeneous goods in markets with few firms. Product differentiation in these markets. How entry and exit affect long-run outcomes in imperfectly competitive markets. Pricing of Homogeneous Goods Market where a relatively few firms produce a single homogeneous good. Assume demanders are price takers. Assume there are no transactions or informational costs. These assumptions result in a single equilibrium price for the good. Initially, assume a fixed, small number of identical firms. Competitive Outcome In Figure 14-1, the equilibrium of the Bertrand game occurs at point C. This equilibrium also corresponds to the perfectly competitive outcome. FIGURE 14-1: Pricing under Imperfect Competition Perfect Cartel Outcome A model of pricing in which firms coordinate their decisions to act as a multiplant monopoly is the cartel model. Assuming marginal costs are constant and equal across firms, the cartel output is point M (the monopoly output) in Figure 14-1. The plan would require a certain output by each firm and how to share the monopoly profits. FIGURE 14-1: Pricing under Imperfect Competition The Cournot Model The Cournot model of duopoly is one in which each firm assumes the other firm;s output will not change if it changes its own output level. Assume A single owner of a costless spring. A market demand curve for water has the equation Q = 120 - P. Nash Equilibrium in the Cournot Model For a pair of quantities, qA and qB, to be a Nash equilibrium, qA must be a best response to qB and vice versa. A’s total revenue equals: A’s marginal revenue equals FIGURE 14-2: Cournot Best-Response Functions Nash Equilibrium in the Cournot Model Equating marginal revenue with the marginal cost of 0, and solving for qA gives A’s best-response function B’s best-response function would then be Nash Equilibrium in the C