LaboratoryExperiments-Sites@Duke.pptVIP

Should A Person Vote? Standard Calculus of Voting Model Vote if PB C P=probability of decisive vote B=benefit from preferred candidate winning C=cost of voting Since C0 and PB is very small, implies people should not vote Bayesian Models But, if no one should vote, then someone should vote since he will be decisive Models incorporate beliefs about how many other voters will vote Predictions Positive turnout Turnout increases with closeness of race More of “underdog’s” voters vote Thomas R. Palfrey, “Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy” Jury Games All jurors have common preferences: convict a guilty defendant, acquit the innocent Each juror has private “signal” about whether defendant is guilty Jurors vote simultaneously or secretly Each juror believes each other juror’s “informedness” (probability of receiving the correct signal about defendant’s guilt) is greater than .5 Equilibrium in Jury Game Solve for case in which a juror is pivotal: If he is pivotal, most other jurors must believe defendant is guilty One Equilibrium: No juror votes innocent when in fact every juror believes the defendant is innocent Problems? The lab is an artificial environment Man is a social animal Context matters * * * Laboratory Experiments Benefits of the Lab As treated = intent to treat (usually) Confounding variables hopefully controlled DVs and IVs can be measured with greater precision than in the field Experimenter can create different and unique “worlds” to examine that may not appear in nature Advantage for testing counterfactuals Some theories imply “dogs that don’t bark” Today Classic psychological experiment in obedience Psychological experiment on stereotyping and minority groups Game theory experiment using animals Voting experiments Milgram Experiments Stanley Milgram. 1963. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology Protocol 40 male subjects recruited from New Haven, CT Told they would participate in an experiment to determine effect of punishment on learnin