国有商业银行利益相关者治理分析研究--_--以中国银行为例.pdf

国有商业银行利益相关者治理分析研究--_--以中国银行为例.pdf

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Abstract As financial intermediaries, Commercial bank has a different general characteristic of enterprises. In corporate governance, Bank can not have been pursuing a shareholder supremacists, but also pay attention to protect the interests of all stakeholders. Chinese state-owned commercial banks matters the national economic lifeline and all aspects of social life. Even a slightest mistake will cause instability of the whole society. So governance of state-owned commercial banks is particularly important stakeholders. Although since 2003, several large state-owned banks have stocks listed, generally establishing a modern corporate governance system in the form. But due to historical and current conditions, property rights of owned bank is not clear. Deposit insurance system has not been established, Bank Credit combined with the National Credit. Bank pursuit profit due to state guarantee .This makes a damage to the healthy development of the real economy. The state-owned share is vast majority, harming the interests of medium and small shareholders. As a major creditor, epositors have no way to participate in Corporate Governance. Bank agency relationship is awesome intricate, but t lack effective oversight mechanisms and have moral hazard. Senior managers appointed by the state-owned banks. Once an employee is hired, he or she generally will not be fired. So banks lack effective incentive and

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