david lewis, “new work for a theory of universals”.pptVIP

David Lewis, “New Work for a Theory of Universals” The Problem of the One over the Many: Many different particulars can all have what appears to be the same nature. This appearance cannot be explained away, but must be accepted. (cf. argument at 213b) In other words, the appearance of oneness (sameness or similarity) suggests real oneness. Or, is it simply the case that there only particulars? Universals and Properties There are two differences between universals and properties: A universal is supposed to be wholly present wherever it is instantiated. A property is spread around. Universals, in Armstrong’s view, are sparse. Properties are whatever can be meaningfully predicated of things. (210) Properties are so abundant that they can’t be counted upon to do work in scientific theories. (cf. 211a) But if we had an elite class of natural properties, the story would be different. “Let us say that an adequate theory of properties is one that recognizes an objective difference between natural and unnatural properties; preferably, a difference that admits of degree. A combined theory of properties and universals is one sort of adequate theory of properties.” (211b) A nominalistic theory could work here, too. We need natural and unnatural properties to provide an adequate supply of semantic values for linguistic expressions. (cf. 212ab) “I also think that it is properties that we need in characterizing the content of our intentional attitudes.” (213a) One over Many Not only does a theory of universals answer the problem of the one over the many, but an adequate nominalism does so as well. “An adequate Nominalism, of course, is a theory that takes Moorean facts of apparent sameness of type as primitive…” (214a) Duplication, Supervenience, and Divergent Worlds Lewis’s aim is to distinguish natural and unnatural properties. Consider duplicates. (215-16) We analyze duplication in terms of shared properties. But to do this we need to distinguish betw