on a network creation game - university of iowa.pptVIP

U C B E R K E L E Y C O M P U T E R S C I E N C E * Network Creation Game  A. Fabrikant, A. Luthra, E. Maneva, C. H. Papadimitriou, and S. Shenker, PODC 2003 (Part of the Slides are taken from Alex Fabrikant’s presentation) * Context The internet has over 20,000 Autonomous Systems (AS) Every AS picks their own peers to speed-up routing or minimize cost Question: What is the performance penalty in terms of the poor network structure resulting from selfish users creating the network, without centralized control? * Goal of the paper Introduces a simple model of network creation by selfish agents Briefly reviews game-theoretic concepts Computes the price of anarchy for different cost functions * A Simple Model for constructing G N agents, each represented by a vertex and can buy (undirected) links to a set of others (si) One agent buys a link, but anyone can use it Cost to agent: Pay $ for each link you buy Pay $1 for every hop to every node Distance from i to j * Example (Convention: arrow from the node buying the link) 1 1 2 2 3 4 -1 -3 c(i)=2.alpha+13 * Definitions V={1..n} set of players A strategy for v is a set of vertices Sv V\{v}, such that v creates an edge to every w Sv. G(S)=(V,E) is the resulting graph given a combination of strategies S=(S1,..,Sn), V set of players / nodes and E the laid edges. Social optimum: A central administrator’s approach to combining strategies and minimizing the the total cost (social cost) It may not be liked by every node. Social cost: * Definitions: Nash Equilibria Nash equilibrium: a situation such that no single player can unilaterally modify its strategy and lower its cost Presumes complete rationality and knowledge on behalf of each agent Nash Equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist, but they do for our model The private cost of player