on the hardness of being truthful - yale university.pptVIP

Inapproximability of Combinatorial Public Projects Michael Schapira(Yale University and UC Berkeley) Joint work with Yaron Singer (UC Berkeley) Overview of the Talk The Combinatorial Public Project Problem. The Submodular Case – Background. A Trivial Truthful Approximation-Algorithm. Our Main Result. Conclusions and Open Questions. Algorithmic Mechanism Design Algorithmic Mechanism Design deals with designing efficient mechanisms for decentralized computerized settings [Nisan-Ronen].  Takes into account both the strategic behavior of the different participants and the usual computational efficiency considerations.  Target applications: protocols for Internet environments. Combinatorial Public Project Set of n users; Set of m resources; Each user i has a valuation function: vi : 2[m] → R≥0 Objective: Given a parameter k, choose a set of resources S* of size k which maximizes the social welfare: Assumptions Regarding Each Valuation Function Normalized: v(? ) = 0 Non-decreasing: v(S) ≤ v(T) S T Subadditive: v( S) + v(T) ≥ v( S υ T) [ Submodular: v( S υ { j })? v(S) ≥ v( T υ { j })? v(T) S T ] Motivating Examples Elections for a committee: The agents are voters, resources are potential candidates. Overlay networks: We wish to select a subset of nodes in a graph that will function as an overlay network. [/ron/] Access Models How can we access the input ? One possibility: succinct valuations computational complexity approach. The “black box” approach: each bidder is represented by an oracle which can answer certain queries. Communication complexity approach. What Do We Want? The Submodular Case [Papadimitriou-S-Singer] Computational Perspective:A 1-1/e approximation ratio is achievable due to the submodularity of the valuations (but not truthful) A tight lower bound exists [Feige]. Strategic Perspective:A truthful solution is achievable via VCG payments (but NP-hard to obtain) What about achieving both simultaneously? T