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key exchange using passwords and long keys - cs.toronto.edu.ppt

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key exchange using passwords and long keys - cs.toronto.edu

Key Exchange Using Passwords and Long Keys Vladimir Kolesnikov Charles Rackoff Comp. Sci. University of Toronto Communication Setting Secure Communication from Shared Random Key Key Exchange (KE) A protocol between two parties Both output (the same) randomly chosen k 2 DK Security Adv does not know anything about k even if it sees all other exchanged keys Adv cannot mismatch players If Alice instance ``thinks’’ she exchanged a key with Bob, then at most one instance of “Bob talking to Alice” may have the same key Players must have secret credentials Defining KE Large amount of prior work An intuitive notion, but hard to define We want our definition to: Be intuitive and easy to use Reject “bad” protocols (allow powerful adversaries) Accept “good” protocols (avoid unnecessary restrictions) Simulation Style KE Definition Game Style KE Definition Our Setting Some of Related Work Hybrid model (C has a pwd and pk of S) Halevi Krawczyk 99, Boyarsky 99 Simulation- vs game-style KE Simulation-style KE Shoup 99, Boyko MacKenzie Patel 00 Universally Composable (UC) Canetti Halevi Katz Lindell MacKenzie 05 Game-style KE Bellare Pointcheval Rogaway 00 Denial of Access (DoA) Attack In Password-Authenticated KE, it is necessary to stop service if “too many” password failures P? Adv can deny access for good guys We can protect against such attacks Require that Adv cannot cause P?, unless he stole key card Don’t know of previous formalizations of DoA Complements Denial of Service notion Our Protocol Password updates Usually handled externally to the definition If C updates his pwd, then DoA attack is possible (Adv can replay old msgs) Problem: have users with related credentials Solutions Update long key as well Have a challenge-response protocol Keep password update counters In the last two cases also need to update definition Can a definition allow for mistyping passwords? We don’t model this What if we allowed Adv to create instances with mistyped passwords? Adv specifies