Trading Effort for Freedom Workday Credits in the Soviet Camp.pdfVIP

Trading Effort for Freedom: Workday Credits in the Soviet Camp System Simon Ertz Free University Berlin Abstract In this paper we focus on the economics of forced labor during Stalinism. We show that, despite the regime’s ability to apply massive coercion, the camp system administrators used various incentives to raise labor productivity. The particular incentive system examined in this paper is the so-called workday credit system. Workday credits used reduced sentences for plan fulfillment and ove rfulfillment to motivate prisoners. An analysis of the economic implications of this instrument enables us to gain insights into the economic goals the camp system administrators pursued. By using a simple choice model to explain the regime’s decision proc ess with respect to the workday credit institution, we find that profitability was a major issue of concern for the administrators of the Stalinist prison camp system. Acknowledgements This paper was prepared for a conference on “Performance and Efficienc y in the USSR: New Measurements and the Bergson Legacy” to be held in memory of Abram Bergson (1914– 2003) at Harvard University on November 23-24, 2003. It contributes to research on the political economy of the Soviet Union under Stalin funded by the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace (principal investigator, Paul Gregory). The author expresses his gratitude to Paul Gregory (Houston University), and Wolfram Schrettl (Free University Berlin) for comments, critical remarks and advice. The author is particularly grateful to the Hoover Institution for providing access