Exploiting BitTorrent For Fun(But Not Profit).ppt

Exploiting BitTorrent For Fun(But Not Profit) Motivation Robustness: system always provides useful service to all connected peers depends on peers’ willingness to contribute but uploading not in peers’ direct self interest Fairness: those who do not contribute should not be able to receive good service Can fairness violations reduce robustness? Selfishness BitTorrent’s fairness model sets rules for data exchange between peers “tit-for-tat” for upload decisions Selfish peers: those who violate fairness while evading detection by abusing existing protocol mechanisms does selfish behavior lead to fairness violations? what is the impact on honest peers? Contributions Designed and evaluated three selfish exploits used as tools for measuring impact on robustness Despite selfishness, BitTorrent quite robust at most 29% higher rates for the selfish peer but no considerable degradation of service How is this robustness achieved? identify worst-case scenarios pinpoint responsible protocol mechanisms propose five guiding design principles Presentation outline BitTorrent operation Experimental methodology Design and evaluation of exploits Proposed design principles Conclusions Ongoing and future work Joining a torrent Peers divided into: seeds: have the entire file leechers: still downloading Exchanging data Peer selection - unchoking Optimistic unchoking periodically select a peer at random and upload to it typically every 3 unchoke periods (30 seconds) multi-purpose mechanism allow bootstrapping of new clients continuously look for the fastest partners keep the network connected: every peer has a non-zero chance off interacting with any other peer Implementation Implemented exploits in the CTorrent client Instrumented the client to collect statistics Exploits clearly do not exhaust the completespace of selfish behavior… but can be used as valuable tools for evaluating the impact of fairness violations on robustness Experimental methodology Private torrent