bank reputation in the private debt market在私.PPTVIP

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Bank reputation in the private debt market 報告者：M9980104黃文仕 M9980206鍾翠綾 Joseph McCatheryArmin Schwienbacher Abstract ◆the impact of lead arranger’s reputation on the design of loan contracts such as spread and fees charged. ◆the non-randomness of the lender-borrower match (self-selection bias). ◆top tier arrangers leads to higher spreads; top tier arrangers retain larger fractions of their loans in their syndicates. IntroductionI ◆Do reputable commercial banks that have better access to good borrowers signal quality through the same channel as bond underwriters? ◆How does this affect the spread and fees charged ? ◆Does reputation affect deal characteristics of private debt through other channels than simple pricing? ◆How does reputation influence the structure and composition of loan syndicates? Introduction II ◆loan syndication is a major segment of the wholesale business of commercial banks in the United States. ◆more than two trillion dollars in commitment volume outstanding,the syndicated loan market is an increasingly important sourse of financing for corporations. ◆a loan syndicate is formed by a mandated arranger, who is appointed by the borrower to bring together a group of institutional investors and banks that are prepared to lend money on specific terms to the borrower. Introduction III ◆top tier underwriters offer better terms to their best clients in order to certify to the market a quality assurance on the issue they underwrite. →underwriter reputation affect IPO underpricing and price revision. ◆the most reputable loan arrangers may have the capability to sherry-pick the best borrowers. →reputation arrangers self-select their borrowers. ◆top tier banks exploit the informational advantage that gives them more market power to charge higher spreads, compared to what borrowers would get in the absence of arranger reputation. Related literature I ◆(Sufi，2007)監督假說，假設借款人的聲譽與主辦行監督之間呈現負相關關係。小型的集團貸款更需要加強監督。 ◆(S