Civitas A Secure Remote Voting System“一个安全的远程投票系统.ppt

Clarkson: Civitas Civitas Civitas Features: Designed for remote voting, coercion resistance, verifiability Supports plurality, approval, Condorcet methods Status: Paper in Oakland 2008 Publicly available: 21,000 LOC (Jif, Java, and C) Prototype …Suitable for IACR? Security Model No trusted supervision of polling places Including voters, procedures, hardware, software Voting could take place anywhere Remote voting Generalization of “Internet voting” and “postal voting” Interesting problem to solve! Adversary Always: May perform any polynomial time computation May corrupt all but one of each type of election authority Distributed trust Almost always: May control network May coerce voters, demanding secrets or behavior, remotely or physically Security properties: Confidentiality, integrity, availability Integrity Verifiability: Including: Voter verifiability: Voters can check that their own vote is included Universal verifiability: Anyone can check that only authorized votes are counted, no votes are changed during tallying [Sako and Killian 1995] Confidentiality Voter coercion: Employer, spouse, etc. Coercer can demand any behavior (vote buying) Coercer can observe and interact with voter during remote voting Must prevent coercers from trusting their own observations Confidentiality receipt-freeness  anonymity Hierarchy: [Delaune, Kremer, and Ryan, CSFW 2006] Availability We assume that this holds To guarantee, would need to make system components highly available JCJ Scheme [Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson, WPES 2005] Formally defined coercion resistance and verifiability Constructed voting scheme Proved scheme satisfies coercion resistance and verifiability [Backes, Hritcu, and Maffei, CSF 2008] Verified simplification in ProVerif Civitas Architecture Registration Voting Resisting Coercion Voters invent fake credentials To adversary, fake ? real Votes with fake credentials removed during tabulation Resisting Coercion Ta