Phil 419, Lecture 6, Being and Doing, Freedom.doc

PHIL 419: 20th C Fr Phil Lecture 6 BN, Part Four, Chapter 1: Being and Doing, Freedom All text ? T Storm Heter, 2007 Overview Now that Sartre has presented a technical notion of human reality (we are “being-for-itself”), he draws conclusions about the nature of human freedom. He concludes that we are ontologically free. Ontological freedom refers to a basic, inescapable condition. This is a staunchly anti-deterministic position. While most anti-deterministic philosophers argue that we are structurally capable of being free, although in many circumstances we are not free, no other philosopher advocates Sartre’s position, which is that we are always, necessarily free, no matter what the situation (ex. torture, imprisonment, violent oppression). So what is this inescapable, ontological freedom? Humans reality is the reality of consciousness, and consciousness is a negation of the given. Humans are thrown into situations which they do not choose, but they have a choice of how to relate to their situation. In this section of Being and Nothingness Sartre explains the paradoxical relationship of freedom and the situation: one is never free, except in and through one’s situation; and yet the situation only revels itself against the contours of our particular projects. Sartre’s mountain example is quite powerful: the reality of the mountain is objective, but this reality never serves as an “objective limit” to human freedom; if one’s project is to climb the mountain, then the mountain is a liberating pathway; if one wishes to see what’s on the other side without obstruction, the mountain in an obstacle. There are no inherent obstacles or open pathways in nature. Nature simply “is”; its contours come into relief vis-à-vis the projects we choose. One of the strongest objections one might make to Sartre’s view of ontological freedom is that it fails to explain phenomena like coercion, oppression and slavery. If humans are necessarily free, then how is oppression