tacticalnuclearweapons,deterrenceandstrategicstability.docVIP

CONTENTS Introduction 1 Profiling Nasr and Prahaar 3 The Nasr 4 The Prahaar 8 Deterrence, strategic stability and SRBMs 12 Definitional issues 13 Theoretical paradigms 15 Assessing deterrence and strategic stability 16 Factors affecting deterrence and stability 17 Correlation of SRBMs, deterrenceand regional stability 17 Impact of political factors 18 Impact of economic factors 20 Impact of military factors 24 Conclusion 32 Notes and references 33 Appendix 49  SRBMs, DETERRENCE AND REGIONALSTABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA: A CASESTUDY OF NASR AND PRAHAAR ZAHIR KAZMI( Introduction During the times of crises, Indian and Pakistani leaders have claimed that their countries eschew nuclear “war-fighting,”(1) implying that their nuclear weapons are meant only for deterrence. Hence, Pakistani and Indian policy to develop short-range ballistic missiles, the so-called tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) or non-strategic weapons, raises the question whether it is a volte-face. The Western retrospective thinking of the Cold War holds that short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) are the sinews for nuclear war fighting whereas the so-called strategic nuclear weapons have just the opposite function. Pakistan flight-tested Hatf-IX — Nasr (victory)(2) on 19 April 2011 and some considered it provocative.(3) Three months later, India unveiled Prahaar(4) (strike) through a flight test on 21 July 2011 but the debate remained muted. Consequently, several questions have come to the fore, which are either partly explained or left unanswered. What prompted Pakistan and India to develop the short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles?(5) If India enjoys conventional supremacy to “draw out [a] war and eviscerate Pakistani military capabilities,”(6) why would it secretly develop Prahaar for almost two years and react to the Nasr test within three months? How would the SRBMs affect deterrence and strategic stability in South Asia? Is the South Asian situation similar to the Cold War c