《第三章 传统博弈理论(1重复博弈)》.ppt

课外阅读：《The Evolution of Cooperation》 Axelrod和Hamilton(1981)通过重复博弈囚徒困境实验，结果表明：K期触发策略最优，具有：清晰、善意、报复性和宽恕性 ——Robert Axelrod; William D. Hamilton. The Evolution of Cooperation, Science, Vol. 211, No. 4489. (Mar. 27, 1981), pp. 1390-1396. 思考：如果双方的贴现率不相等δ1≠ δ2 （1）为啥不相等？（2）出现啥新结果？ When players have different discount factors, possibly reflecting the players’ heterogeneous time preferences or different access to capital markets, the feasible payoff set of a repeated game is generally larger than the convex hull of the underlying stage-game payoffs, because unequal discounting enables the players to tra