中国上市公司高管薪酬的激励问题与对策分析讲解.doc

致谢那一段麻烦再补充一段 文章还需要结尾 “总结与展望” 本科毕业论文 中文题目：中国上市公司高管薪酬的激励问题与对策分析 外文题目：Analysis on Chinas listed companies executive compensation incentive problem and countermeasure 院 系 国际商学院 专 业 财务管理ACCA 年 级 2012级 学 号 20201236140009 学 生 袁 菁 指导教师 代 彬 结稿日期 2016年3月10日 四川外国语大学教务处制  中国上市公司高管薪酬的激励问题与对策分析 摘要：本文是以委托代理理论为基础，企业股东就是委托人，他们一般会将公司的具体经营管理权力让渡与委托给代理人，也就是公司的高管人员。但是归因于二者所具有的差异性目标，此种不一致就极易引致公司的经营者会以自身的目标为出发点来进行操作，故而，也就需要一种激励机制来对其进行约束，此时，薪酬激励机制就能发挥最好的约束作用。从高管与薪酬的定义出发，以委托代理理论和人力资本理论为研究的基础，通过分析包括公司规模与公司业务的成长性等影响上市公司高管薪酬的因素，分析上市公司高管薪酬的激励问题，并进一提出上市公司高管薪酬的激励的对策建议。 关键词：上市公司；高管薪酬；激励问题；对策建议 Analysis on Chinas listed companies executive compensation incentive problem and countermeasure Abstract: This article is based on the principal-agent theory, the enterprise shareholder is the client, they will tend to the assignment of the specific power management company with the entrusted agent, is the companys senior executives. But due to the difference of both goals, such inconsistency is easy to cause the companys business operators in their target as the starting point for the operation, so, also need a kind of incentive mechanism to constraint, at this point, the salary incentive mechanism can exert the best effect. Starting from the definition of executives and compensation to the principal-agent theory and human capital theory as the research foundation, through the analysis including the company scale and the growth of the company such as factors that influence the executive compensation of listed companies analysis of executive compensation incentive of listed companies, a leading also puts forward several Suggestions on the executive compensation incentive of listed companies. . Key words: Listed company; Executive pay; Incentive problems; Countermeasures and Suggestions 致谢 在论文撰写的全过程当中，我指导老师代彬对该论文从选题，构思到最后定稿的各个环节给予细心指引与教导使我得以最终完成