关于货币宪法的还原论反思.doc

关于货币宪法的还原论反思 詹姆斯-M-布坎南 郭少飞译 卡托杂志，第9卷，第2期（1989年秋季刊）。版权属于卡托研究所，所有权利保留。 作者是诺贝尔经济学奖获得者，乔治梅森大学公共选择理论研究中心主任。他感谢大卫-方得和维克多-范伯格的有益评论。 译者注：还原论是一种哲学观点，主张把高级运动形式还原或减化为低级的运动形式，认为现实中的每一种现象都可看成更基本、更低阶的现象的集合体，因此低级运动的规律可代替高级运动规律，从研究方法上通过对最基本的现象进行研究，化繁为简，可以把握事务规律。 原文请参见/pubs/journal/cj9n2/cj9n2-2.pdf。 REDUCTIONIST REFLECTIONS ON THE MONETARY CONSTITUTION James M. Buchanan The Absence of a Monetary Constitution There exists no monetary constitution, as such, in the United States. What does exists is an institutionally established authority charged with an ill-defined responsibility to “do good”, as determined by its own evaluation. We would have no difficulty in classifying an analogously directed military junta in a Latin American setting as nonconstitutional, by which we would mean, quiteproperly, that it operates in accordance with no predictable rules of behavior. Viewed in this perspective, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to mount intellectually respectable defenses for continuation of the monetary institutions that are in being. Yet we observe relatively little revolutionary fervor, even among political economists, to challenge the institutionalized status quo. A shift in regime that would put in place a genuine monetary constitution, one that would incorporate stable and predictable rules of the game, would generate an outward displacement in the value feasibility space for the economy. By reducing the uncertainty involved in each and every transaction made in nominal monetary values, each potential transactor can share in the newly available increment to value surplus. Failure to introduce a constitutional regime in money, therefore, amounts to a collective refusal to implement a technological improvement that is acknowledged to be mutually beneficial. Explaining the Persistence of the Status Quo How do we explain our observed failure to exploit this opportunity to increase our well-being? Small, and possibly influential, groups do exist which secure rents be