WorstCase Optimal Redistribution of VCG Payments最坏情况下的最优分配VCG支付.pptVIP

Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulationunder some common voting rules Voting Manipulation Manipulation: a voter (manipulator) casts a vote that is not her true preference, to make herself better off. A voting rule is strategy-proof if there is never a (beneficial) manipulation under this rule Manipulation under plurality rule (ties are broken in favor of ) Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [Gibbard 73, Satterthwaite 75] When there are at least 3 alternatives, there is no strategy-proof voting rule that satisfies the following conditions: Non-imposition: every alternative wins under some profile Non-dictatorship: there is no voter such that we always choose that voter’s most preferred alternative Computational complexity as a barrier against manipulation Second order Copeland and STV are NP-hard to manipulate [Bartholdi et al. 89, Bartholdi Orlin 91] Many hybrids of voting rules are NP-hard to manipulate [Conitzer Sandholm 03, Elkind and Lipmaa 05] Many common voting rules are hard to manipulate for weighted coalitional manipulation [Conitzer et al. 07] All of these are worst-case results: it could be that most instances are easy to manipulate Some evidence that this is indeed the case [Procaccia Rosenschein 06, Conitzer Sandholm 06, Zuckerman et al. 08, Friedgut et al 08, Xia Conitzer 08a, Xia Conitzer 08b] Unweighted coalitional manipulation (UCM) problem Given a voting rule r the non-manipulators’ profile PNM alternative c preferred by the manipulators number of manipulators |M| We are asked whether or not there exists a profile PM (of the manipulators) such that c is the winner of PNM∪PM under r Problem is defined for unique winner and co-winner Complexity results about UCM Maximin For any alternatives c1≠c2, any profile P, let DP(c1, c2)=|{R∈P: c1Rc2}| - |{R∈P: c2Rc1}| Maximin(P)=argmaxc{minc DP(c, c)} Theorem [McGarvey 53] For any D:{(c1, c2): c1≠c2}→N (where the values in the range have the same parity, i.e., either all odd or all even