Anti-Corruption Agencies A Review of Experience.doc

Anti-Corruption Agencies: A Review of Experience Final Paper REVISED DRAFT By Patrick Meagher IRIS Center, University of Maryland Submitted to the World Bank PREM-ECA August 2, 2002 Acknowledgements: This paper could not have been produced without the guidance and support of Randi Ryterman and Jim Anderson of the World Bank; the assistance of Samjhana Thapa, Fang Rong, Aziz Ahmad, and Michael Radosh, all students at the University of Maryland; and the expert input of Melissa Thomas, Diana Rutherford, and Gabriela Mossi of IRIS. Deserving of special recognition are the authors of the three original case studies that served as source material for part 4 of the paper, namely Luigi Manzetti of Southern Methodist University, Teresa Benedict of Transparency International/ Malaysia, and Haji Semboja and James Kajuna of the Economic and Social Research Foundation, Tanzania. Any faults are the author’s own. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1 Structure of the paper 1 2. Researching and Assessing Anti-Corruption Agencies 3 Defining and Measuring Success 4 Towards a Workable Set of Performance Indicators 8 Explaining Success 10 3. Previously Documented Cases 14 The Single-Agency Paradigm: Hong Kong and Singapore 14 Establishment 15 Responsibilities and Powers 16 Safeguards and Relationships 18 Resources 20 Performance Monitoring 21 Summary and Assessment 23 Variations on the Single-Agency Model 24 Establishment, Responsibilities and Powers 24 Safeguards, Relationships 26 Resources 29 Performance Monitoring 30 Summary and Assessment 32 The Alternative: Multiple-Agency Approaches 33 The U.S 33 India 35 The EU and Others 37 Conclusion 39 4. Original Case Studies 40 Establishment 40 Argentina 40 Malaysia 42 Tanzania 45 Responsibilities and Powers 46 Argentina 46 Malaysia 48 Tanzania 49 Safeguards and Relationships 50 Argentina 51 Malaysia 53 Tanzania 55 Resources 56 Argentina 56 Malaysia 58 Tanzania 60 Performance Monitoring 61 Argentina 61 Malays