SupplyChainContractingwithCompetingSuppliersunderAsymmetricInformation--RuinaYang.pptVIP

Research Interest Production Operations Management / Financial Interface Procurement Risk Management Inventory Management Salesforce Management Game Theory Ocean Shipping Motivation (cont’) Asymmetric information -- Retailer’s proximity to consumers, Private information Research Questions How should competing suppliers design incentive contracts? How does contract type affect the degree of information asymmetry? Which contract type should suppliers rely on under competition and asymmetric information? Agenda Literature Review The Model Optimal Strategy Two-part Tariff vs. Quantity Discount Conclusion Future Research Stage-1: Optimal Contract Design Given supplier j’s contract bundles, supplier i’s contract design problem Main Results—Independent Products (Sensitivity analysis) (i) When the two products are independent, the equilibrium purchasing price increases with the degree of aggressiveness v , while increases with v if and only if (ii) Both equilibrium franchise fees decline as v increases. Numerical Experiments Figure 2: Changes in information rent and suppliers’ expected profit as ρ increases Numerical Experiments Figure 3: Changes in information rent and suppliers’ expected profit as v increases Future Research Demand state follows a continuous distribution Other contracting mechanisms --- Take-or-pay, quantity flexibility and option contract Supply chain structure of n competing suppliers and one retailer Thank you! Then we can model the problem of supply chain contracting in a setting of two suppliers and one retailer under asymmetric information as a two-stage game. In particular, the sequence of events can be defined as follows: Usually, we use back induction to solve the problem. Given the signed contracts, the retaielr chooses the retail price, which determine the demand rates of products, to maximize his profit. To use screen models to get the---Later on, we study the equilibriu