K. Awareness, negation and logical omniscience.pdfVIP

下载本文档

5
0
约4.39万字
约 19页
2017-04-11 发布于江苏
举报
版权申诉

K. Awareness, negation and logical omniscience.pdf

1、原创力文档（book118）网站文档一经付费（服务费），不意味着购买了该文档的版权，仅供个人/单位学习、研究之用，不得用于商业用途，未经授权，严禁复制、发行、汇编、翻译或者网络传播等，侵权必究。。
2、本站所有内容均由合作方或网友上传，本站不对文档的完整性、权威性及其观点立场正确性做任何保证或承诺！文档内容仅供研究参考，付费前请自行鉴别。如您付费，意味着您自己接受本站规则且自行承担风险，本站不退款、不进行额外附加服务；查看《如何避免下载的几个坑》。如果您已付费下载过本站文档，您可以点击这里二次下载。
3、如文档侵犯商业秘密、侵犯著作权、侵犯人身权等，请点击“版权申诉”（推荐），也可以打举报电话：400-050-0827(电话支持时间：9:00-18:30)。
4、该文档为VIP文档，如果想要下载，成为VIP会员后，下载免费。
5、成为VIP后，下载本文档将扣除1次下载权益。下载后，不支持退款、换文档。如有疑问请联系我们。
6、成为VIP后，您将拥有八大权益，权益包括：VIP文档下载权益、阅读免打扰、文档格式转换、高级专利检索、专属身份标志、高级客服、多端互通、版权登记。
7、VIP文档为合作方或网友上传，每下载1次，网站将根据用户上传文档的质量评分、类型等，对文档贡献者给予高额补贴、流量扶持。如果你也想贡献VIP文档。上传文档

K. Awareness, negation and logical omniscience

Awareness, Negation and Logical Omniscience Zhisheng Huang and Karen Kwast Department of Mathematics and Computer Science University of Amsterdam Plantage Muidergracht 24 1018TV Amsterdam, The Netherlands Abstract General Epistemic Logics suffer from the problem of logical omniscience, which is that an agent’s knowledge and beliefs are closed under implication. There have been many attempts to solve the problem of logical omniscience. However, accord- ing to our intuition, sometimes an agent’s knowledge and beliefs are indeed closed under implication. Based on the notion of awareness, we introduce two kinds of negations: general negation and strong negation. Moreover, four kinds of impli- cations, general implication, strong implication, weak implication, and semi-strong implication, are introduced to correspond with the two kinds of negations. In our logics of regular awareness, explicit beliefs are not necessarily closed under general implication, which means that agents are not logically omniscient. However, ex- plicit beliefs are closed under strong implication and semi-strong implication, which captures an intuitive closure property of beliefs. ’Not’ is not not. - C. J. Date 1 Introduction As is well known, general epistemic logics, namely, logics of knowledge and belief, suffer from the problem of logical omniscience. The so-called logical omniscience problem is that an agent’s knowledge and beliefs are closed under logical implication. There have been many attempts to solve the problem of logical omniscience[3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19]. Some approaches are syntactic, others focus on the refinement of possible world semantics. The general goal is to offer a formalism by which an agent’s knowledge and beliefs need not to be closed under logical implication. However, according to our intuition, sometimes an agent’ knowledge and belief are indeed closed under implication. Of course, it is often pointed out that the logical closure of an agent’s knowledge and bel