NGLAD-bulatom.pptVIP

Titel der Veranstaltung BELENE NPP  SAFETY IC SYSTEMS BASED   ON TELEPERM XS BULGARIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY – NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND WORLD ENERGY SAFETY Varna 27-29.05.09 Guideline for the Presentation Requirements by Customer and IAEA Identification of IC Systems Plant Control Philosophy Overview System Platform Teleperm XS Teleperm XS References Requirements by NEK and IAEACorrelation between Classification Concepts NEK requires a Safety function classification based on IAEA and International Electro technical Commission (IEC) Nuclear Standard The correlation between Safety classes of fluid-retaining components Classes of IC systems according to IAEA NS-G-1.3 Classes of IC systems according to IEC 61513 Categories of IC FSE according to IEC 61226 is provided in this table. 1. Requirements by NEK and IAEASafety Philosophy Safety Philosophy Concept of Defense in Depth Distribution of IC Functions Availability Reliability Maintainability Credibility Integrity - Security Redundancy and Single Failure Criterion, Prevention of Common-Cause Failures Diversity of IC Systems Independence and Separation 2. Identification of IC Systems The IC functions are grouped as follows: Process information and control functions Reactor limitation functions Reactor power control functions Protection functions Automatic backup functions Post accident monitoring functions On the basis of the identification of functions that are required IC systems are established to perform these functions. The main systems are: Process Information and Control System (PICS) Safety Information and Control System (SICS) Process Automation System (PAS) Safety Automation System (SAS) Reactor Limitation and Control System (RLCS) Protection System (PS) Passive Heat Removal System (PHRA) Post Accident Monitoring System (part of SICS) These IC systems make up the architecture of the Instrumentation and Control System. 3. Plant Control Philosophy 3.1 Protection System Re