诊断和匡正资本主义的致命缺陷.ppt

Some economists have denied the problem entirely. Some claim that China cannot face the same fate as other countries for one of several reasons: a) because Chinese buyers were forced to make large down payments (30-40% of the house price), b) because most investment is being made by state-owned enterprises, or c) because the Chinese government has large cash reserves. This way of thinking is typical of “ex post” explanations. It draws upon a specific feature of a situation that is different from other cases and makes it a central factor. This happened in Japan in the early 1990s, when people claimed that the real estate bubble could not burst there because Japan is small and mountainous. Yet, the bubble burst in Japan, land prices declined sharply, and the banking system lost its liquidity. 有些经济学家已经完全否认了问题的存在。另一些人指出由于以下某个原因，中国不会像其它国家那样面临同样的命运。这些原因包括，第一，中国的购房者必须支付房屋价格30-40%的款项；第二，大多数投资来自国有企业；第三，中国政府拥有大量的现金储备。这是一种典型的“解构性解释”的思考方式。这种思考方式利用了某一不同于其它事件情形的特征，使之成为主要因素。这种情况在20世纪90年代早期的日本曾经发生过，当时，人们认为由于日本是一个多山的小国，所以房地产泡沫不会破裂。然而，日本的房地产泡沫还是破裂了，土地价格急剧下跌，银行系统丧失了流动资金。 Some analysts have argued that there is no housing bubble in China because the 70-city index reported by the National Statistics Bureau shows that housing price growth in China has been no more rapid than in some other countries. What those analysts fail to recognize is how speculation in local real estate markets can damage the entire economic system. In the United States, only a small number of regional markets created a crisis that has affected the entire world. After the 2007 real estate decline, just 35 counties in 4 states (out of 50 states and more than 3,000 counties nationally) accounted for 50% of the foreclosures in 2008. In the 1930s, the failure of a single bank holding company in Detroit, which had been weakened by lending on real estate speculation, was the proximate cause of the 1933 “bank holiday,” the temporary suspension of all banking operations in the U.S. to prevent a national panic. Thu