01-第一章会 计 学(41页).pptVIP

Slide 1-## corporate governance and accounting Accounting and Economics share some common basic assumptions : First level: scarcity of resources, complexity and uncertainty of environment, economic men with bounded rationality Second level: information incompleteness and asymmetry, opportunistic behavior tendency (different utility functions, externality of behavior), positive transaction cost Result: incomplete contracts The Nature of the Firm: Jensen Meckling(1976) the nexus of a set of contracts between owners of production factors, a legal fiction corporate governance and accounting The Ownership of the Firm: residual control rights claim to firm’s residue Agency problem: 1.principal (information disadvantage) and agent (information advantage) :observability of agent’s action, risk preference 2.adverse selection and moral hazard ex ante information asymmetry ex ante opportunistic behavior ex post information asymmetry ex post opportunistic behavior ex ante i.e. pre-contract, ex post i.e. post-contract *ex ante opportunistic behavior i.e. adverse selection :screening, signalling, how to induce candidates tell the truth,cost of signal is so high that others can not to reproduce *ex post opportunistic behavior i.e. moral hazard : ---monitor:social, law, market( market for corporate control,managerial labor market, competitive product and service market,creditors monitor,large shareholders etc.) ---incentive: pecuniary incentive(salary,bonus, restricted stock,stock option, stock appreciation right , phantom stock , long-term performance plan etc.); non-pecuniary incentive(control,reputation,self-satisfaction etc.) corporate governance and accounting 3.agency cost----monitoring costs, bonding costs, residue losses * Corporate Governance and Accounting 1. the concrete arrangement of the ownership of the firm 2. a set of