(国外学术资料)Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector(Holmstrom and Tirole,1997).pdf
- 1、本文档共30页,可阅读全部内容。
- 2、原创力文档(book118)网站文档一经付费(服务费),不意味着购买了该文档的版权,仅供个人/单位学习、研究之用,不得用于商业用途,未经授权,严禁复制、发行、汇编、翻译或者网络传播等,侵权必究。
- 3、本站所有内容均由合作方或网友上传,本站不对文档的完整性、权威性及其观点立场正确性做任何保证或承诺!文档内容仅供研究参考,付费前请自行鉴别。如您付费,意味着您自己接受本站规则且自行承担风险,本站不退款、不进行额外附加服务;查看《如何避免下载的几个坑》。如果您已付费下载过本站文档,您可以点击 这里二次下载。
- 4、如文档侵犯商业秘密、侵犯著作权、侵犯人身权等,请点击“版权申诉”(推荐),也可以打举报电话:400-050-0827(电话支持时间:9:00-18:30)。
查看更多
Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector
Author(s): Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole
Source: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 663-691
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: /stable/2951252
Accessed: 18-12-2015 02:32 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use, available at /page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@.
Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Quarterly Journal of
Economics.
This content downloaded from 22 on Fri, 18 Dec 2015 02:32:46 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE
QUARTERLY
JOURNAL
OF ECONOMICS
Vol. CXII August 1997 Issue 3
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, LOANABLE FUNDS, AND
THE REAL SECTOR*
AND
BENGTHOLMSTROM JEAN TIROLE
We study an incentive model of financial intermediation in which firms as
well as intermediaries are capital constrained. We analyze how the distribution of
wealth across firms, intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment,
interest rates, and the intensity of monitoring. We show that all forms of capital
tightening (a credit
您可能关注的文档
- (博弈论与经济模型)第二章博弈与均衡.doc
- (博弈论与经济模型)第三章完全信息静态博弈.doc
- (博弈论与经济模型)第八章委托——代理理论:合约经济学.doc
- (博弈论与经济模型)第十一章监督与效率工资制度.doc
- (博弈论与经济模型)第十章多任务代理及产权:委托—代理模型的一种扩充.doc
- (博弈论与经济模型)第四章纳什均衡的存在性与多重性.doc
- (国外学术资料)Managerial Incentive Problems from a dynamic perspective(Holmstrom,1999).pdf
- (国外学术资料)Moral Hazard and Observability(Holmstrom, 1979).pdf
- (国外学术资料)Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses(Holmstrom &Milgrom,1991).pdf
- (国外学术资料)Private and public supply of liquidity(Holmstrom,Tirole,1996).pdf
文档评论(0)