基于模糊机会约束的博弈联盟收益.pdfVIP

第 30 ~给第 11 期 北京现工大学学报 Vo l. 30 No.11 2010 年 11 月 Transactions of Beijing Institute of Technology Nov. 2010 基于模糊机会约束的博弈联盟收益 逢金辉1 ， 陈秋萍2 (1.北京理工大学信息资源管理研究所，北京 100081 ,2. 沙洲职业工学院基础科学系，江苏，张家港 215600) 梢 .:在模糊博弈环檐下，研究联现收蔬问题.篡于 1、surumi 合作联lRl概念，利用模糊变最刻丽局中人参与联组 程度.拓展了模糊联盟概念.针对博弈决策者在一定.倍水平下极大化联盟收益的乐观值或极大化联盟收益的悲 观值情形，寻|入模糊变蟹的可倍性测度.建立了模糊联盟最优收益的模糊机会约束规划模到.该模型反映了博弈偏 好对模糊联盟臣在体收益的影响. 关键诩:模糊合作联烧I Choquet 积分，可信性测度$模糊机会约束规划 中图分类昌.:0159 ， C94 叉院栋怠码:A jtJ位编号: 1001-0645(2010) 11-1383-04 Payoff Function of Game Coalition ßased on Fuzzy Chance Constraint 2 PANG Jin-huP , CHEN Qiu-ping (1. Administrative Institute of Information Resources. Beijing lnstitute of 丁echnology， Beijing 100081. China , 2. Department of Foundation Science. Shazhou Professional Institute of Technology. Zhangjiagang. ]iangsu 215600. China) Abstracl: 丁his article researches the payoff of game coalition under fuzzy game environment. Fuzzy variables were allowed to describe the rates of players participation to the fuzzy game coalition. A new concept of payoff function was proposed based on the fuzzy game concepts by Tsurumi. For the practical game problem that decision-makers will maximize the optimistic return or the pessimistic return at a predetermined confidence level. credibility measure of fuzzy variables were introduced. Moreover. a fuzzy chance阳constrained programme model was built to seek the payoff of game coalition. which was the maximum optimistic return or pessimism return. 1、 hc proposed model reflects that the payoff gained from fuzzy game coalition will more depend on players preference. Key words: fuzzy game