基于收益博弈理论的水利工程质量监督研究.pdfVIP

北京水务 2015 年第 5 期 · 工程建设与管理· 噩 到〈删 刘春阳 ( 北京市水利基本建设工程质量监督中心站 100038) 摘要 结合工作实际，指出水利工程建设过程实际上就是质量监督机构与工程参建单位收益博弈 过程。 通过前提、参数假设，建立了质量监督机构与工程参建单位的收益博葬矩碎，并且对收益博弈 策略、监督力度与惩罚力度进行分析研究，得出结论。 对当前水利工程质量监督存在的问题进行了剖 析， 提出了粮动机构职能改革、加强诚信体系建设、健全法律法规的对策与建议。 关锺词 水利工程 质量监督 收益博弈 中图分类号 TV51 文献标志码 A 文章编号 1673-4637(2015 )05-0036-03 Study 00 qωlity supervisioo or hy也-aulic eogin制ringba提d 00 Game 由eory U U Chun-yang ( Beijing Quality Supervision Center of Capital Cons川ction Projects in the Water Sector , }C削38 ， China ) Abstract In this paper, combined with the actual work ,it is pointed out that process of Hydraulic Engineer- ing construction , in fact , is a profit game process between the quality supervi sion in stitution and and engi- neering con struction units. Through making hypothesis of premise , parameter , the matrix of earning game was established between the quality supervision institution s and engineering units. The earnings game strategy , su- pervision and punishment were analyzed , and drew a conclusion. Finally , the current problems exist in quali- ty supervision of hydraulic engineering was analyzed . To promote the reform of institutions function , strength- en the integrity system , improve laws and reguIations ， ωme countermeasures and su路estions were proposed . Keywords hydraulic engineering qual ity supervision earning game 1 研究背景 监理单位及施工单位等水利工程参建单位 其主要 行为是为了实现各自工程质量利益最大化气质量监 在水利工程建设过程中 质量监督机构受水行 督机构与参建单位，为了实现各自的效用、利益最 政