开发区类企业的企业化博弈演进分析.pdfVIP

上海理工大学学报 第 30 卷第5 期 J. University of Shanghai for 如ience and TechnoI呗Y Vol. 30 No.5 200R 文章编号: 1007 - 6735(2008)05 呵。485 呵。4 开发区类企业的企业化博弈演进分析 .JL刘才9p (上海现工大学贷规学院，上海 2∞093) 摘要:基于我国开发区发展瓶盖员现象和一个动态博鼻模型，指出开发区类企业所具有的特珠的企 业形态.该类企业在开发区初创阶段，以完成政府的效用为其义务.政府在开发区发展的各个阶段， 其效用函数是不间的，当政府的期望效用基本完成之后，就应当逐渐退出其行政控制.由于政府的 政啧诉求和权威惯性，其行政控制的退出往往比较迟缓.通过开发鼠类企业与政府的利益博弈，开 发区类企业逐步完成其纯企业化的过程.这种博弈引发的交易成本可能使得开发区类企业的纯企 业化过程时间过长，从而导致整个过程的非效率性. 关键词:开发区类企业;企业化;动态博鼻 中图分类号: F 069.9 文献标识码:A AnaIysis on the game evoIvement of firm dea Iing in development zone to be enterprised KONG Uu- liu (Business ~协时， Uníversity 01拙an肘ai 卢r Scie7附and Technology ，拗anghai 200093 ，队ina) Abstract: Based on the bottle-neck phenomenon of development zone in China , the article sets up a dy- namic game model to reveal the special conformation of the firms dealing in development wne. This type of firms carries the govemmental utility as its duty in the beginning te口n of zone foundation. Gov- ernment has different utilities in different te口ns and should gradual1y retreat from the administration control to the íirrn whenever its basic utilities have been fulfilled. However , govemment usually will defer retreat due to appealing for achiev阳lent and inertia of authority. Through the g;创ne with the gov- ernment , the firm completes its process of being a real enterprise. 丁he ∞st of the game will probably prolong the pr侃ess of the firm to be enterprised and lead to economic inefficiency. Key words: firm dealing in develoρment zone; being enterρrised; dynamic game 有一些纯企业所不具有的特殊特征，它们与当地政 开发区在我国经济开放和改革过程中扮满着重