第二章eva激励机制的基本理论.doc

EVA在企业激励机制中的应用 中文摘要 随着现代企业制度的逐步建立与完善，我国企业激励机制存在的问题日益暴露。建立在会计利润基础之上的传统业绩衡量的有效性和可信度指标受到了挑战。由于会计利润易于被企业经营者操纵，以及没有考虑股权资金的机会成本，使得我国绝大多数公司对管理人员的资金激励机制中出现了严重的问题，就是管理层利益和股东利益之间的联系十分微弱，从而导致一些提高公司会计利润的行为实际上是在侵蚀股东财富。为此，设计一套有效的激励体系对经营者的行为进行激励，从而实现股东价值最大化的目标，是我国企业亟待解决的问题。 20世纪90年代以来，EVA激励机制在理论和实践层面都得到了突破性的发展。该激励机制通过对投资资金“机会成本”的测算，突出强调了“经济利润”，认为只有在经营者对股东做出承诺，并在计算出正的净现值的基础上做出的投资决定才能被认定为经营人为企业创造了财富。按照这一理念，EVA激励机制将企业经营成果与薪酬挂钩，赋予管理者与股东一样的关于企业成功与失败的心态。 系统地梳理EVA激励机制形成的背景及其基本理论内容，以青岛啤酒成功引入该激励机制的成功案例作为分析对象，深入探究该机制在应用实施过程中的优势及其存在的问题，在此基础上，分析应用这一机制对我国企业改制的启示及在应用这一机制中应该注意的问题所在，对我国企业的改革和发展具有长远的意义。 关键词：经济增加值 激励机制 资本成本 案例分析 Abstract With the establishment and perfection of modern enterprise system, the shortcomings of the enterprise incentive mechanism in China are becoming increasingly exposed. The effectiveness and credibility of the accounting of profits based on the traditional performance measurement had been challenged. Because the traditional accounting profit can be manipulated by the enterprise managers easily as well as fails to take the opportunity cost of equity capital into consideration, the present financial incentive mechanism applied in most of our companies caused some serious problems, the most serious one of which is there is a very weak control between the benefits of the management and the interests of its shareholders, which results in the erosion of shareholders’ wealth. Thus, it becomes urgent to design an effective incentive system for the conduct of the operator incentives, in order to achieve the goal of maximizing shareholder value. Since 1990s, the incentive system of EVA had made great breakthrough both in theory and practice. The incentive system put forward the conception of opportunity cost into the evaluation of the managers’ performance and estimates the economic profits, which believes that it can be considered to be successful in creating wealth for the whole enterprise only when the manager EVA of the enterprise is increasing. Thus, it is prospective