an analysis of the principal-agent problem（委托代理问题的分析）.pdf

An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem Author(s): Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart Source: Econometrica, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan., 1983), pp. 7-45 Published by: The Econometric Society Stable URL: /stable/1912246 Accessed: 12/01/2010 14:34 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use, available at /page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at /action/showPublisher?publisherCode=econosoc. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. The Econometric Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Econometrica. Econometrica,Vol. 51, No. 1(January, 1983) AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM BY SANFORD J. GROSSMAN AND OLIVER D. HART Most analyses of the principal-agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agents utility being at a stationary point. An important paper of Mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid. We pre