auditor independence, dismissal threats, and the mar- ket value of switches（审计师的独立性,解雇威胁和mar -刃开关的价值）.pdf

Accounting Research Center, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago Auditor Independence, Dismissal Threats, and the Market Reaction to Auditor Switches Author(s): Siew Hong Teoh Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), pp. 1-23 Published by: Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of Accounting Research Center, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago Stable URL: /stable/2491089 . Accessed: 17/08/2012 17:38 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use, available at . /page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. . Wiley-Blackwell and Accounting Research Center, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Accounting Research. Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 30 No. 1 Spring 1992 Printed in U.S. A. Auditor Independence, Dismissal Threats, and the Market Reaction to Auditor Switches SIEW HONG TEOH* 1. Introduction This paper analyzes the effect of auditor changes on security prices in two alternative regimes. In the first, the auditor follows a mechan- ical decision rule; in the second, the auditor takes into account the possibility that an adverse audit opinion may lead to dismissal. I show that in either regime, investors reaction to switches depends on the context of the switch