tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics（tiebout经济体与微分遗传类型和内生选择聚集特征）.pdfVIP

Tiebout Economies with DiÆerential Genetic Types andy Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics John P. Conley* and Myrna Wooders** Revised: June 2000 y The authors are indebted to the National Science Foundation and Social Sci- ences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the National Science Foundation, respectively, for support. We are also indebted to Manfred Dix, Vladislav Gorlov, Stephanie So and Jana Vyrastekova. The Ørst author thanks the departments of economics at Harvard and Boston Universities, where this work was completed and the second thanks participants in seminar series on club theory at California Institute of Technology, Bielefeld University and Tilburg University. * Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Champaign, Ill 61820, USA ** Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1, Canada Abstract We consider a Tiebout economy with diÆerential crowding and pub- lic projects in which agents are distinguished by their tastes and genetic endowments. Agents choose which crowding characteristic, for example, skill, they wish to express, and this aÆects their value to other members of their jurisdiction, club, Ørm, etc. An agents choice is inuenced both by his genetic endowment, which aÆects his cost of acquiring crowding characteristics, and his preferences over which crowding characteristic he expresses. We show that if small groups are strictly eÆective, the core is equivalent to the set of anonymous competitive equilibrium outcomes, but that the core generally contains taste-homogeneous jurisdictions. Journal of Economic Literature ClassiØcation