(法学专业英语Unit3)Text A.doc

All Beings That Feel Pain Deserve Human Rights — Equality of the species is the logical conclusion of post-Darwin morality Richard Ryder A B C D E F G H I J K L The word speciesism came to me while I was lying in a bath in Oxford some 35 years ago. It was like racism or sexism — a prejudice based upon morally irrelevant physical differences. Since Darwin we have known we are human animals related to all the other animals through evolution; how, then, can we justify our almost total oppression of all the other species? All animal species can suffer pain and distress. Animals scream and writhe like us; their nervous systems are similar and contain the same biochemicals that we know are associated with the experience of pain in ourselves. Our concern for the pain and distress of others should be extended to any “painient” — pain-feeling — being regardless of his or her sex, class, race, religion, nationality or species. Indeed, if aliens from outer space turn out to be painient, or if we ever manufacture machines who are painient, then we must widen the moral circle to include them. Painience is the only convincing basis for attributing rights or, indeed, interests to others. Many other qualities, such as “inherent value,” have been suggested. But value cannot exist in the absence of consciousness or potential consciousness. Thus, rocks and rivers and houses have no interests and no rights of their own. This does not mean, of course, that they are not of value to us, and to many other painients, including those who need them as habitats and who would suffer without them. Many moral principles and ideals have been proposed over the centuries — justice, freedom, equality, brotherhood, for example. But these are mere stepping stones to the ultimate good, which is happiness; and happiness is made easier by freedom from all forms of pain and suffering (using the words “pain” and “suffering” interchangeably). Indeed, if you think about it carefully you can see that the r