双重成本控制标准下企业收益分配信号博弈-控制与决策.pdfVIP

绗?0 鍗 绗? 鏈 鎺 鍒 涓 鍐 绛 2015 骞 4 鏈 Vol. 30 No. 4 Control and Decision Apr. 2015 鏂囩珷缂栧彿: 1001-0920 (2015) 04-0764-05 DOI: 10.13195/j.kzyjc.2014.0164 鍙岄噸鎴愭湰鎺у埗鏍囧噯涓嬩紒涓氭敹鐩婂垎閰嶄俊鍙峰崥寮 瀛熷嚒鐢 (鍝堝皵婊ㄥ伐绋嬪ぇ瀛︾粡娴庣鐞嗗闄? 鍝堝皵婊?50001) 鎽 瑕? 鎸夌収鍙岄噸鎴愭湰鎺у埗鏍囧噯瀵逛紒涓氬憳宸ヨ繘琛屽垎绫? 灏嗕紒涓氬拰鍛樺伐浣滀负鍙備笌鏀剁泭鍒嗛厤鍗氬紙鐨勫眬涓汉, 璁ゅ畾浠栦滑鍦 鏀剁泭鍒嗛厤绛栫暐閫夋嫨涓潎涓虹悊鎬т汉, 鑳藉閫夋嫨浣胯嚜宸卞埄鐩婃渶澶у寲鐨勭瓥鐣? 鏍规嵁浼佷笟鍦ㄦ敹鐩婂垎閰嶄腑鍏锋湁鐨勪俊鎭紭鍔? 鏋勫缓 鍙岄噸鎴愭湰鎺у埗鏍囧噯涓嬬殑浼佷笟鏀剁泭鍒嗛厤淇″彿鍗氬紙妯″瀷, 鎻愬嚭鍗氬紙鍙兘鍑虹幇鐨? 绉嶅潎琛＄粨鏋滃拰鏉′欢, 鎸囧嚭鍙湁鍦ㄥ憳宸ョ‘ 瀹氬叾鏀剁泭鎭板ソ绛変簬棰勬湡, 涓斾紒涓氭彁渚涢珮鏀粯鏂规鏃舵墠浼氬嚭鐜版渶鏈夋晥鐜囩殑鍒嗙鍧囪　, 鍏朵粬3 绉嶇粨鏋滈兘涓嶆槸鏈€鏈夋晥鐜囩殑 鍧囪　. 鍏抽敭璇岤 鎴愭湰鎺у埗鏍囧噯锛涗俊鍙峰崥寮堬紱鏀剁泭鍒嗛厤锛涘潎琛 涓浘鍒嗙被鍙耳 F275.3 鏂囩尞鏍囧織鐮? A Game for enterprise income distribution signal under dual cost control standard MENG Fan-sheng (School of Economics and Management锛孒arbin Engineering University 锛孒arbin 150001 锛孋hina 锛嶤orrespondent: MENG Fan-sheng 锛孍-mail 锛?3mfs@163.com) Abstract: According to the dual cost control standard, the employees are classi铿乪d, the enterprise and employees are treated as the players participating income distribution game, which are considered to be all rational people in the choice of income distribution strategies and can choose the strategies to make their own bene铿乼s maximization. On this basis of information advantages of the enterprise in the income distribution, the game model of enterprise income distribution signal under dual cost control standard is established, the possible four kinds of equilibrium results and conditions are proposed. It is pointed out that when employees ensure income is just equal to expectation and enterprise provides high payment scheme, the most ef铿乧iency separating equilibrium will appear,