Central Banks - The Issue of Credibility and Reputation：中央银行的信誉和声誉问题.pptVIP

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Central Banks - The Issue of Credibility and Reputation：中央银行的信誉和声誉问题.ppt

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Central Banks - The Issue of Credibility and Reputation：中央银行的信誉和声誉问题

Lecture 8 Central Banks - The Issue of Credibility and Reputation This lecture addresses two issues: Credibility The distinction between rules and discretion a) credible commitments b) rules can be learned by private agents, discretion cannot Lucas v Tinbergen Tinbergen paradigm - discretionary policy can be used to meet set objectives. If there are ‘n’ targets we need ‘n’ independent instruments to satisfy targets Lucas critique - very act of discretion undermines its effectiveness A modest policy of rules would be more effective The Leader - Follower paradigm Lucas approach treats the economy as a collection of optimising agents But the government is also an optimising agent The government can be treated as a leader private agents are followers Leader-follower game (Stackelberg) Illustration of leader - follower game At each date a speculator can raise domestic currency which is sold for foreign currency. He pays a fixed charge of ‘c’ per transaction Assume that there is a limit to which the speculator can sell in each period - transactions or liquidation costs If a devaluation occurs the benefit is ‘π’ per unit of domestic currency leader - follower continued If a devaluation occurs - profit is π - ct; t=1,2,.. and ct is the opportunity cost Government has reserves of $R It is forced to devalue when it runs out of reserves Assumptions For a given level of reserves, the government prefers maintaining the exchange rate to devaluation For a given exchange rate it prefers more reserves to less 2 $R 3 π/2 c π Stackelberg Game Possible equilibrium Speculators will sell until the government decides to devalue Thus the government devalues immediately delaying devaluation can occur only until t=3 But suppose government can pre-commit not to devalue until all reserves are gone devaluation does not occur Conclusions Solution concepts matter. Nash, Stackelberg, perfect equilibrium etc. Even if it is accepted that the government is a leader, the inability to make s