微观经济学Microeconomics英文课件PPT 29 Game Applications.ppt

Strategic Bargaining 0 1 A B x3 Y N Period 3:A offers x3. B responds. How should B respond to x3?Accept if 1 – x3 ≥ 0; i.e., accept any x3 ≤ 1. (x3,1-x3) (0,0) Strategic Bargaining 0 1 A B x3 (0,0) Y N Period 3:A offers x3. B responds. How should B respond to x3?Accept if 1 – x3 ≥ 0; i.e., accept any x3 ≤ 1.Knowing this, what should Aoffer? (x3,1-x3) x3=1 Strategic Bargaining 0 A B (1,0) (0,0) Y N Period 3:A offers x3 = 1. B accepts. How should B respond to x3?Accept if 1 – x3 ≥ 0; i.e., accept any x3 ≤ 1.Knowing this, what should Aoffer? x3 = 1. x3=1 Strategic Bargaining 0 1 A 0 1 B 0 A B A x1 (x1,1-x1) Y N x2 (x2,1-x2) Y N Period 1:A offers x1. B responds. Period 2:B offers x2. A responds. B Y N Period 3:A offers x3 = 1. B accepts. (1,0) (0,0) Coexistence Games; The Hawk-Dove Game Bear 1 Bear 2 ?1H ?2H 1 1 0 0 4/9 ?1H ?2H 1 1 0 0 4/9 Coexistence Games; The Hawk-Dove Game ?1H ?2H 1 1 0 0 4/9 The game has a NE in mixed-strategies in whicheach bear plays Hawk with probability 4/9. Coexistence Games; The Hawk-Dove Game 8,0 -5,-5 4,4 0,8 Hawk Dove Hawk Dove Bear 2 Bear 1 For each bear, the expected value of the mixed-strategy NE is(-5)× + 8× + 4× = , a value between-5 and +4 81 16/ 81 20/ 81 25/ 81 180/ Some Important Types of Games Games of coordination Games of competition Games of coexistence Games of commitment Bargaining games Commitment Games Sequential play games in which One player chooses an action before the other player chooses an action. The first player’s action is both irreversible and observable by the second player. The first player knows that his action is seen by the second player. Commitment Games 5,9 5,5 7,6 5,4 1 2 2 a b e c d f Game Tree Player 1 has twoactions, a and b. Player 2 has twoactions, c and d,following a, and two actions e and ffollowing b.Player 1 chooseshis action beforePlayer 2 choosesher action. Direction of play Commitment Games 5,9 5,5 7,6 5,4 1 2 2 a b e c d f Is a