产业经济学10.pptVIP

Chapter 10 : Integration Alternatives and Antitrust Chapter 10:Integration Alternatives and Antitrust Chapter 10 : Integration Alternatives and Antitrust Chapter 10 : Integration Alternatives and Antitrust Chapter 10 : Integration Alternatives and Antitrust Chapter 10 : Integration Alternatives and Antitrust Chapter 10 : Integration Alternatives and Antitrust Chapter 10 : Integration Alternatives and Antitrust Pricing Alternatives to Integration ? So far, upstream and downstream firms have only been able to set simple linear prices: uniform pricing ? Two-part tariff: A price with a fixed component (f) and a variable component P = f + p*q – This is one simple form of non-linear pricing – Average price per unit (f/q + p) is not constant Chapter 10 : Integration Alternatives and Antitrust Two-part Tariff Could End Double Marginalization ? Consider a simple two-part tariff of the form P = f + p*q – How could the upstream firm use a two-part tariff to achieve same market outcome as vertical integration? ? f = ? ? p = ? – More natural for upstream firm to use a twopart tariff rather than the downstream firm? Chapter 10 : Integration Alternatives and Antitrust Chapter 10 : Integration Alternatives and Antitrust Contractual Alternatives ? Aside from non-linear pricing schemes like a two-part tariff, there are contractual solutions to double marginalization ? Maximum retail price: Manufacture forbids downstream firm from selling good above a specified price – Resale price maintenance (RPM): Direct manipulation by upstream firm of the price at which the product is sold to final consumers Chapter 10 : Integration Alternatives and Antitrust Chapter 10 : Integration Alternatives and Antitrust RPM is Illegal ? RPM is illegal in Canada, U.S. and E.U. – Per se illegal in U.S. – Causes the most antitrust enforcement acti