垃圾回收行业中的不完全竞争【外文翻译】.docVIP

本科毕业论文（设计） 外 文 翻 译 外文题目 Imperfect competition in the recycling industry 外文出处 Metroeconomica, Feb2005, Vol. 56 Issue 1, p1-24. 外文作者 Thomas Eichner 原文： IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN THE RECYCLING INDUSTRY ABSTRACT We study the market allocation in an economy where material is used for producing a consumption good, then recycled and ?nally land?lled, and where a recycling ?rm has market power. The material content constitutes an aspect of green product design and affects the recycling costs. Although the recycling ?rm’s supply of recycling services is inef?ciently low, it does not abuse its market power to distort the product design allocation. Different policy schemes are proposed which correct for market failures. One promising candidate is a relative recycling standard combined with a consumption good’s tax, a material subsidy and a subsidy on recycling services. 1. INTRODUCTION In recent years many countries have made strong efforts to stimulate recycling in order to reduce the waste ?ow. A prominent case in point is Germany where waste management was reorganized according to the German green dot program from 1990 and the Law of Circular Material Flows (Kreis-laufwirtschafts- und Abfallgesetz) from 1996.Closely related to the problem of waste avoidance is the question of how to design products greener so that they are better recyclable. Existing studies have contributed to the understanding of product design and recycling. The analyses have been carried out in static partial or general equilibrium models encompassing the whole lifecycle of a consumption good and assuming that agents act under perfect competition. Different facets of product design have been investigated:Fullerton and Wu (1998) and Choe and Fraser (1999) focus on disassembly properties of consumption goods, Eichner and Pethig’s (2001a, 2001b) product design is the material mix whereas Calcott and Walls (2000) analyze the impact of weight on recycling