[经济学]第七讲 完美信息动态博弈：延伸与讨论.pptVIP

第七讲 Extensive games with perfect information: extensions and discussion 一、Allowing for simultaneous moves:Variant BoS Figure Strategies and Nash equilibrium Strategies and Nash euqilibria of a variant of BoS Subgame perfect equilibrium A subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive game with perfect information and simultaneous moves is a strategy profile with the property that in no subgame can any player increase her payoff by choosing a different strategy, given the other players’ strategies. To find the set of subgame perfect equiliria of an extensive game with perfect information and simultaneous moves that has a finite horizon , we can use backward induction. Subgame perfect equilibria of a variant of BoS The game has two subgames: the whole game, and the game in which the players engage after player 1 chooses Concert. Backward induction proceeds of a variant of BoS: In the subgame that follows the history Concert, there are two Nash equilibria (in pure strategies), namely (S,S) and (B,B). If the outcome in the subgame that follows Concert is (S,S), then the optimal choice of player 1 at the start of the game is Book. If the outcome in the subgame that follows Concert is (B,B), then the optimal choice of player 1 at the start of the game is Concert. We conclude that the game has two subgame perfect equilibria: ((Book,S), S) and ((Concert, B), B) Notice Every finite extensive game with perfect information has a (pure) subgame perfect equilibrium. The same is not true of a finite extensive game with perfect information and simultaneous moves, because a finite strategic game may not possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (like Matching Pennies). But there maybe is a “mixed strategy Nash equilibrium”, in which each player randonmizes. 二、Illustration: entry into a monopolized industry Figure Nash equilibrium of Cournot’s duopoly game Consider the subgame that follows the history Out Subgame perfect equiliria Conclusions 三、 Illustration: Tariffs and imperfect