行为金融学 讲座8.pdf

14.127 Behavioral Economics (Lecture 8) Xavier Gabaix April 1, 2004 1 Decision utility • Economists use the word “utility” to describe the preferences that ratio- nalize observed choices. • Kahneman calls these revealed preferences “decision utility”. • These are the preferences that rationalize decisions. • These are the preferences that coincide with “wanting” and “choosing.” • For an addict the decision utility of drug consumption exceeds the decision utility of quitting. 2 Experienced utility • Kahneman also measures the hedonic consequences of choices. • He calls these actual hedonic experiences, “experienced utility.” • These are the preferences that coincide with “doing.” • This is how Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) conceived of utility (pleasure and pain) • How do you measure hedonic experiences (e.g., well-being)? • How do you discount these experiences over time? Measuring experienced utility: • observer ratings • real-time self-reports of mood, pain, pleasure, or happiness (palm pilot) • facial measures • autonomic measures (autonomic nervous system, including electrodermal, respiratory, and cardiovascular) • vocal measures (pitch, loudness, tone, quality, timing) • left brain assymetry (electroencephalogram – EEG) • responses to emotion-sensitive tasks (e.g., Would you like to talk with a good friend?) Why might decision utility and experienced utility fail to coincide? A couple examples: • the decision is cognitively hard to make • poor forecasts of preference dynamics, e.g., — failures to anticipate adaptation (paraplegics, lottery winners, junior faculty turned down for tenure), Gilbert et al (psychological immune system) — failures to anticipate visceral effects (Loewenstein’s aggression stud