大股东的支撑与掏空行为分析——基于三联集团案例的分析论文报告.doc

大股东的支撑与掏空行为分析 ——基于三联集团案例的分析 教 学 点： 宁波电大余姚学院 专 业： 会计学（本） 入学时间： 二○一四年三月 学生姓名： 高瞻远 学 号： 1433101201132 指导教师： 顾建莉 二○一六年五月大股东的支撑与掏空行为分析 ——基于三联集团案例的分析 目录 abstract 2 内容摘要 3 一、文献综述 4 （一）大股东支撑行为理论 4 （二）大股东掏空行为理论 5 （三）大股东支撑和掏空行为对称理论 6 二、案例背景 6 （一）案例综述 6 （二）三联商社公司背景 7 （三）三联集团公司背景 8 三、 案例分析 9 （一）大股东的支撑行为 9 （二）大股东的掏空行为 12 四、政策建议 18 参考文献 20 Abstract In recent years, more and more cases of listing Corporation shareholders use loan guarantees, related-party transactions, capital occupation and empty or invade the interests of small shareholders. We found that large shareholders, not only occupy the interests of small shareholders, they will also have to invest the behavior of company. Support and tunneling behavior is the behavior of transfer large shareholders in order to maximize their own interests and take the direction of different interests. That supports the intention is for listed or improve the performance of the company, and the tunneling behavior is of practical interest to the big shareholders, causing damage to the value of the company and the interests of small shareholders. In this paper, the Sanlian Group case to explore verification support and tunneling behavior of Chinese listing Corporation shareholders, the motive and the goal, as well as the major shareholder support and tunneling behavior is the corresponding. Specific analysis of large shareholders to support and tunneling through the manner in which the financial impact of the company and. And put forward the corresponding countermeasures and governance mechanism. Key words: supporting behaviour tunneling governance mechanism 大股东的支撑与掏空行为分析 ——基于三联集团案例的分析 内容来股东利用贷担关联资股东利来我们发现股东单纯股东利们会对进资撑为。股东撑为益获输为。股东撑为为够财务业绩为则是为将股东输给 股东对股东利损联团来验证我国股东撑为动股东撑为对应股东过进撑对财务影响对应对关键词股东撑为为来国资场股东股东利例频频发国独权结点,股东间着权。股东为经济选择时我们发现股东单纯股东利时如为获权资资股东会将资源输给为股东撑为。撑为股东们终称为间过联团验证股东撑为。对进绍财务标、营运权结对响较股东撑为进别股东股东股东）对股东有许义股东强调具实质质股东谓实质间过董事会来经营决项股东Fr1edman,Johnson和Mitton(2003)最早提出大股东撑(Propping)为概将大股东撑为定为当处财务危时股