外文翻译---企业税收筹划的有效性.docVIP

译文一：企业税收筹划的有效性：基于对报酬的激励作用（上） 译文二：企业税收筹划的有效性：基于对报酬的激励作用（下） 学生姓名 学 号 院 系 经济与管理学院 Corporate Tax-Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation-Based Incentives (Ⅰ) John D. Phillips University of Connecticut ABSTRACT This study investigates whether compensating chief executive officers and business-unit managers using after-tax accounting-based performance measures leads to lower effective tax rates, the empirical surrogate used for tax-planning effectiveness. Utilizing proprietary compensation data obtained in a survey of corporate executives, the relation between effective tax rates and after-tax performance measures is modeled and estimated using a two-step approach that corrects for the endogeneity bias associated with firms decisions to compensate managers on a pre- versus after-tax basis. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that compensating business-unit managers, but not chief executive officers, on an after-tax basis leads to lower effective tax rates. KEYWORDS tax planning; performance measures; endogenous treatment effects. I. INTRODUCTION Effective tax planning, defined by Scholes et al. (2002) as tax planning that maximizes the firms expected discounted after-tax cash flows, requires managers to consider their decisions after-tax consequences. In this paper, I investigate whether after-tax accounting-based performance measures lead to lower effective tax rates (ETR), my empirical surrogate for tax planning effectiveness.1 The ETR, an income-statement-based outcome measure calculated as the ratio of total income tax expense to pre-tax income, generally measures the effectiveness of tax reduction strategies that lead to higher after-tax income. A lower ETR, however, can only proxy for tax savings and does not always imply that after-tax income and/or cash flows have been maximized.2 Despite this limitation, the ETR has been used to measure the effectiveness of spending