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Polling With Physical EnvelopesA Rigorous Analysis of aHuman–Centric Protocol Tal Moran Joint work with Moni Naor Cryptographic Randomized Response “Randomized Response Technique” [War65] Method for polling stigmatizing questions Idea: Lie with known probability. Specific answers are deniable Aggregate results are still valid Problem: responders may have incentive to cheat E.g., Pre-election polls CRRT [AJL04]: Use cryptographic techniques to prevent cheating Uses ZK, OT or quantum cryptography Requires either computers or quantum equipment CRRT and AnthropoCryptography Responder’s trust is critical when polling sensitive questions We can’t assume responders have knowledge of computers or cryptography Our protocols must take into account human abilities and limitations: Previous Work Visual Cryptography [NS94] Private computation using a Pez dispenser [BCIK03] “Applied Kid Cryptography” [NNR] Basing Cryptographic Protocols onTamper-Evident Seals [MN05] Our Results Protocols for CRRT using scratch-off cards and envelopes Simple enough to be practical Our protocols are secure in Canetti’s UC model Allows secure black-box composition Lower bounds on Implementations of “Strong” CRRT. Scratch-Off Cards and Envelopes Contain a “sealed” message Can’t read the message without breaking the seal It is evident when the seal is broken p-CRRT: What we would like Assume the answer to the poll is either 0 or 1,p is fixed: ?p1 Responder chooses one of two strategies: Result is 0 with prob. p and 1 with prob. 1-p Result is 1 with prob. p and 0 with prob. 1-p Responder cannot influence the output beyond choosing the strategy The pollster gets no additional information about the strategy chosen beyond the result itself. p-CRRT: What we can get Assume the answer to the poll is either 0 or 1,p is fixed: ?p1 Responder chooses one of two strategies: Result is 0 with prob. p and 1 with prob. 1-p Result is 1 with prob. p and 0 with prob. 1-p Responder cannot influen