哈佛大学--博弈论课件英文section6章节幻灯片.pptVIP

GOV 2005—Game Theory Episode 6 The Grim Trigger Alexis Diamondadiamond@fas.harvard.edu Agenda Main ideas Key terms Basic strategy for solving a repeated game Example Problem Set-up Mathematical detour (infinite series) Solution and implications Conclusion Main Ideas Cooperation is possible in a repeated game when it is repeated indefinitely (or infinitely), and when people place sufficient value on future payoffs Sometimes we talk about the “shadow of the future” being sufficiently small Equivalent to saying that the discount rate is sufficiently small Typically requires a strategy based on the credible threat of punishment in response to defection Reintroduces the notion of continuation value Typically allows for a multiplicity of strategies Reputation can matter in a repeated game Key Terms Grim Trigger: Begin by cooperating, with defection rewarded by the punishment of never-ending pain Continuation value: present value of a payoff stream Discount factor: degree to which future is valued, δ, bounded by [0, 1] may think of it as probability you’re in the game next round History: past actions taken by players Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium: An equilibrium that specifies a Nash-equilibrium strategy in every subgame, particularly appropriate for repeated games Basic Strategy Read the problem, noting strategic setting Identify the question Usually, “Find conditions sufficient to sustain a certain stable pattern of behavior; describe the equilibrium.” FIRST: Guess at what the equilibrium might be Usually a grim trigger strategy, where cheating is rewarded with never-ending punishment THEN: Check to make sure that this strategy fulfills equilibrium conditions That it is a best response for players to perform the prescribed behavioral pattern. Write down the entire set of strategies and sufficient conditions Usually the condition is a bound on the discount rate Example Problem Consider infinite repetition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma: C D C 3, 3