英文版产业经济学教程第一章文档.pptVIP

3.4 New Industrial Organization (NIO)： The second trends NIO, after 70s,20th . Focus on strategic behavior analysis. Game theory as the uniform mean in NIO. And non-cooperative game theory is dominative in it. Cournot-Bertrand paradox Cournot,1838 output selected as optional variable. In equilibrium point, price is higher than marginal cost, but lower than monopoly price. Bertrand,1883 price selected as optional variable. In equilibrium point, price equals to marginal cost. So, although Cournot’s premise looks not so realistic, but its conclusion suits to reality while Bertrand’s premise seems more realistic, but it gets a little extreme conclusion. The solution to this paradox is the topic of large papers of NIO since 70s,20th . * Research on contrary causality, namely market behavior’s effect to future market structure. Many market phenomena such as price war, patent race, merger, RPM (resale-price maintenance) and advertising war can be explained by strategic interaction among corporations. That’s another aspect of topics of NIO. IO has been the third important aspect among economics research domains, only behind microeconomics and macroeconomics. * Limitation of NIO Mainly origins from its means. Bounded rationality Premise is too subtle and sometimes questionable. (especially about shared beliefs) The result is hard to get experiential prove. (Bresnahan and Schmalensee,1987) “类似某种由不规则的碎片所组成的几何体”（Fractalization）， “目前已成为一个由高度精致和特定的模型构成的迷宫，每一模型得出的结论只能应用于满足模型假设的特定场合”。（马丁，2003，p10） * 老产业组织学（即SCP范式，也称哈佛学派，或结构学派等) 也研究与垄断和反垄断相关的问题，但他早期的理论色彩远逊于主要以博弈论为研究方法的新产业组织学。老产业组织学SCP范式中的因果关系（Mason,1939；Bain, 1951,1956），以及后来的双向和反馈关系（Scherer and Ross,1990,p.5），开始主要是经验性的，只是在产业组织学引入博弈论后，才具有了坚实的微观基础和严密的逻辑体系(Jacquemin,1999)。这也是为什么早期老产业组织学及其反垄断政策受到芝加哥学派等不断攻击的缘故。 在反垄断问题上的互补 * 而博弈论的应用和发展则有力的回击了芝加哥学派的批评，验证和支持了早期老产业组织学的许多结论与政策建议（Munter,1999；马丁，2003，p.9）。博弈论的研究成果表明，在一定的市场环境中，厂商会选择一定的策略性行为以影响竞争对手的行为和市场环境，这些行为具有限制竞争，危害消费者和社会福利的后果，所以反垄断应积极对它们进行规制。这个观念与芝加哥学派