on session key construction in provably-secure key establishment protocols revisiting chen文档.pdfVIP

On Session Key Construction in Provably-Secure Key Establishment Protocols⋆ Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Colin Boyd, and Yvonne Hitchcock Information Security Institute Queensland University of Technology GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD 4001, Australia {k.choo,c.boyd,y.hitchcock}@.au Abstract. We examine the role of session key construction in provably- secure key establishment protocols. We revisit an ID-based key establish- ment protocol due to Chen Kudla (2003) and an ID-based protocol 2P-IDAKA due to McCullagh Barreto (2005). Both protocols carry proofs of security in a weaker variant of the Bellare Rogaway (1993) model where the adversary is not allowed to make any Reveal query. We advocate the importance of such a (Reveal) query as it captures the known-key security requirement. We then demonstrate that a small change to the way that session keys are constructed in both protocols results in these protocols being secure without restricting the adversary from asking the Reveal queries in most situations. We point out some errors in the existing proof for protocol 2P-IDAKA, and provide proof sketches for the improved Chen Kudla’s protocol. We conclude with a brief discussion on ways to construct session keys in key establishment protocols. 1 Introduction Key establishment protocols are used for distributing shared keying material in a secure manner. For example, today’s cryptosystems, such as AES, use key es- tablishment schemes to establish shared keying material. However, despite their importance, the difficulties of obtaining a high level of assurance in the security of almost any new, or ev