Dialectics and Distinction Reconsidering Hannah Arendt ：辩证法和阿伦特的区别的反思.Image.Marked.pdf

Reconsidering Hannah Arendts Reading of Marx: From the Critique of Totalitarianism to the Critique of the Dialectic 2011 CPSA Presentation (Please do not cite without permission) Christopher Holman Department of Political Science, York University, and Department of Philosophy, Stony Brook University Abstract Perhaps the most often criticized element of Hannah Arendt‟s political theory is her insistence on the necessity of constructing and maintaining rigid boundaries between various activities of the human condition. Less often, however, is the attempt undertaken to determine the philosophical motivation stimulating this project of distinction. This paper will attempt to demonstrate the extent to which Arendt‟s imperative is rooted in a certain misreading of the Marxian dialectic. The first part of the paper will outline the contours of Arendt‟s erroneous interpretation of Marx‟s understanding of labour, demonstrating the degree to which the latter breaks down the tripartite structure of the vita activa. The second part of the paper will read Arendt‟s affirmation of distinction as being a response to what Arendt will take to be the problems of the dialectic, specifically the dialectic‟s allegedly necessary positing of conceptual contingency and logical necessity. Finally, the third part of the paper will demonstrate, through an examination of two key passages in the work of Marx, the extent to which Marx himself was just as concerned with overcoming the type of homogenous and abstract universalism rejected by Arendt. The ground will thus be provided for the overcoming of the necessity of Arendtian distinction, and perhaps also for a more fruitful engagement between the Marxian and Arendtian theoretical problematics.