《国际经济学》教师手册及课后习题答案(克鲁格曼,第六版)imch09.doc

HAPTER 9 The Political Economy of Trade Policy Chapter Organization The Case for Free Trade Free Trade and Efficiency Additional Gains from Free Trade Political Arguments for Free Trade National Welfare Arguments against Free Trade Case Study: The Gain from “1992” The Terms of Trade Argument for a Tariff The Domestic Market Failure Argument against Free Trade How Convincing is the Market Failure Argument? Box: Market Failures Cut Both Ways: The Case of California Income Distribution and Trade Policy Electoral Competition Collective Action Modeling the Political Process Who Gets Protected? Box: Politicians for Sale: Evidence from the 1990s International Negotiations and Trade Policy The Advantages of Negotiation International Trading Agreements: A Brief History The Uruguay Round Trade Liberalization From the GATT to the WTO Box: Settling a Dispute, and Creating One Benefits and Costs Preferential Trading Agreements Box: Free Trade Versus Customs Unions Box: Do Trade Preferences Have Appeal? Case Study: Trade Diversion in South America Summary Appendix: Proving the Optimum Tariff is Positive Demand and Supply The Tariff and Prices The Tariff and Domestic Welfare Chapter Overview The models presented up to this point generally suggest that free trade maximizes national welfare, although it clearly is associated with income distributional effects. Most governments, however, maintain some form of restrictive trade practices. This chapter investigates reasons for this. One set of reasons concerns circumstances under which restrictive trade practices increase national welfare. Another set of reasons concerns the manner in which the interests of different groups are weighed by governments. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the motives for international trade negotiations and a brief history of international trade agreements. One recurring theme in the arguments in favor of free trade is the emphasis on related efficiency gains. As illustrated by the consumer/