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行动的理由与道德的基础
行动的理由与道德的基础
【内容提要】 行动的理由是当代西方元伦理学与行动哲学的核心议题之一。该理论是用理由来解释行动的哲学企图,即试图在认知性的理由与意动性的行动之间实现理论上的完美契合。在该问题上,休谟主义与康德主义成为两大主流的且相互竞争的理论。休谟主义立足于休谟的欲求概念来刻画理由给予行动现实动机的内在机制,强调欲求是行动的终极诉求,理由是欲求主导下的衍生物,是内在性的,即理由内在主义。康德主义则着眼于行动理由的规范性,立足康德的理性与主体性原则打造行动价值与行动动机的终结性源泉,强调理由对行动的规范性约束是主体自主建构的结果。一个完满的行动理由理论必须同时回答行动理由的动机性与规范性两个维度的问题,然而休谟主义与康德主义在各自的理论体系之内均无法完满地回答理由的外在规范性问题。对行动道德价值的规范性判断如果能够成立,仅仅依靠“规范理由”的概念是不够的,最终必须对价值本体问题作出回答,从而使行动理由的理论真正能够为伦理道德提供哲学之根基。Reason for action has become one of the key issues in contemporary Western metaethics and philosophy of action. It is a philosophical attempt to bridge reason of cognitive nature with action of intentional nature, thus explaining action by means of reason. Humeanism and Kantianism have become two dominant and competing approaches to this issue. Humeanism proposes a mechanism of how reason gives motivation to act based on Humes concept desire, and argues that reason, as internal, is produced by serving desires, which are the ultimate end for human actions. On the other hand, Kantianism is devoted to the normativity issue of reason for action. Drawing on Kants principles of rationality and autonomy, it argues that reason is the source of motivation and value of action, and the normative authority of reason is constructed autonomously by the agency. Any sound theory of reason for action has to address the two dimensions. But neither Humeanism nor Kantianism has addressed adequately the external normativity of reasons. To judge the moral value of an action, it is not enough to rely on the concept of normative reason. Instead, for normative judgments on it to be legitimate, and for theory of reason for action to offer a foundation for morality, we have to address soundly the metaphysics of value. 【关 键 词】行动的理由/道德的基础/道德实践性/价值/元伦理学????reason for action/foundations of morality/moral practicality/value/metaethicsEE3UU8396166
????[中图分类号]B82-02 [文献标识码]A [文章编号]0439-8041(2010)05-0048-07????“行动的理由”(reasons for action)是当代西方元伦理学界兴起的一个重要话语体系,目的是通过追溯道德的实践性问题最终
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