Three-Party Encrypted Key Exchange Without Server Public-：三方加密密钥交换不需要服务器的公共—.pptVIP

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Three-Party Encrypted Key Exchange Without Server Public-：三方加密密钥交换不需要服务器的公共—.ppt

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Three-Party Encrypted Key Exchange Without Server Public-：三方加密密钥交换不需要服务器的公共—

Three-Party Encrypted Key Exchange Without Server Public-Keys C. L. Lin, H. M. Sun, M. Steiner, and T. Hwang IEEE COMMUNICATIONS LETTER, VOL. 5, NO.12, DEC. 2001 Presented by Tung-Her Chen (2002/05/28) Outline Introduction Related Works LSSH-3PEKE Performance Comparison Conclusions Introduction(1/5) 1976 Diffie and Hellman : Key Distribution public key authentication issue Men in the middle attack 1992 Bellovin and Merritt : Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) A and B securely share a password in advance Every two clients share a common secret Introdcution(2/5) Password guessing attacks Detectable on-line password guessing attacks Undetectable on-line password guessing attacks Off-line password guessing attacks Introduction (3/5) 1995 Steiner, Tsudik, and Waidner : Three-party EKE( STW-3PEKE) Trusted server S Threatened by on-line password guessing attacks Threatened by off-line password guessing attacks Introduction (4/5) 2000 Lin, Sun, and Hwang : LSH-3PEKE Server public-key 2001 Lin, Sun, Steiner, and Hwang : LSSH-3PEKE Without server public-key Introduction (5/5) Related Work -Notations A, B, S, A*, B*, S* PA, PB, KS [M]K, MPI, {M}K fK(M), h(M), H1(k), H2(k) p, g NA, NB, NS, RA= gNA mod p flow i Related Work -STW-3PEKE (1995) Related Work (1995) -STW-3PEKE Weakness(1) Related Work (2000) -STW-3PEKE Weakness(2) Related Work (2000) -LSH-3PEKE LSSH-3PEKE (2001) Performance analysis Conclusions LSSH-3PEKE scheme Both one-line and off-line guessing attack will not work Perfect forward secrecy Without Server public-Keys Comments More complex; more insecurity. Public key techniques are unavoidable for password protocols that resist off-line guessing attack.(1999) You can try it… * * 1992 EKE (IEEE Symp. On Research in Security and Privacy) 1995 STW-3PEKE (ACM Operating Syst. Rev.) 2000 LSH-3PEKE (ACM Operating Syst. Rev.) 2001 LSSH-3PEKE (IEEE Communications Letters) Every two users share a common secret Password guessing attack Server’s Public Key A B S RA⊕B